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Abstract
Philosophical discussions of health and disease have traditionally been dominated by a
debate between normativists, who hold that health is an inescapably value-laded concept
and naturalists, such as Christopher Boorse, who believe that it is possible to derive a purely
descriptive or theoretical definition of health based upon biological function. In this paper
I defend a distinctive view which traces its origins in Aristotle’s naturalistic ethics. An
Arisotelian would agree with Boorse that health and disease are ubiquitous features of the
natural world and thus not mere projections of human interests and values. She would differ
from him in rejecting the idea that value is a non-natural quality. I conclude my discussion
with some comments of the normative character of living systems.
Introduction
Our conduct affects our health just as our health affects our
conduct. Unsurprisingly then the question of the relationship
between physical health and moral well-being is an ancient one.
The Greeks noticed that morality and medicine seemed inextrica-
bly entwined: the work of a typical Hellenistic moralist could
easily be exchanged for that of a doctor and only the most astute
scholar would notice. A few centuries later Descartes in his final
work, The Passions of the Soul, boldly announces that he will
approach the emotions neither as ‘an orator, nor a moralist’ but
through medical science, before settling into well-worn moralizing
territory.1 [1] In our own day, worries about the over-
medicalization of social and moral problems persist. Should
naughty children be given enough amphetamines to make the
average street corner dealer blush? Should clearly psychotic killers
be dragged to execution simply to placate the baying mob?
These questions are perhaps insuperable. Programmatic state-
ments by leading medical bodies help little. The WHO’s famously
hyperbolic declaration carries the ambivalence deep within its
core. Health, it admonishes, ‘is a state of complete physical,
mental and social well-being and not merely the absence of disease
or infirmity’ [2]. For all its lofty ambition, many sympathize with
Robert Hughes’ quip that this definition better befits ‘a bovine than
a human form of life’ [3]. Its insistence upon the socially activist
nature of medicine troubles those who believe that we do best
when we are left alone. Even the more circumspect note its sys-
tematic vagueness. What on earth would ‘complete physical,
mental and social well-being’ look like and how to tell when one
achieved this Elysian state?
Philosophy flourishes where confusion abounds. In this context,
a vigorous and sometimes acrimonious debate has emerged
between normativists, who insist that medical diagnoses are inher-
ently value-laden and naturalists, who believe that it is possible to
formulate a purely descriptive theory of health. Normativism
remains the consensus view among philosophically sophisticated
doctors [4–6]. Conversely, naturalism has exerted its greatest pull
upon philosophers for whom value-freedom is the hallmark of
science and who aspire to see medicine become truly scientific
[7–9].
It might seem therefore that there is no real dispute: normativ-
ism appeals to practising doctors while philosophers with scien-
tific ambitions can content themselves with constructing pristine
but practically useless definitions of health. Such a compromise
would, I contend, be a mistake. In medicine, theory and practice
are conjoined twins. For that reason, it should not surprise us that
normativism purchases practical applicability at the expense of
theoretical incoherence, while naturalism gains theoretical clarity
1 p. 17 There is some controversy about the best way to render Descartes’
expression ‘comme un physicien’ Voss opts for ‘physicist’ which is correct
in the context of the work but we should also bear in mind that Descartes
in common with the medievals treated ‘physiology’ and ‘physics’ as syn-
onyms.
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at the cost of defining health and disease in ways unrecognizable
by most practitioners or patients.
My aim in this paper will be to find a way through this morass.
I will defend a broadly Aristotelian naturalism about health
[10–12]. It is naturalist in two senses: first, it regards human beings
as animals, albeit peculiar ones, and recognizes no gaping void
between us and the rest of organic nature; second, it considers
value as an inherent feature of our shared natural world. Conse-
quently our moral evaluations are made in the same logical tone of
voice that we use when we evaluate any living being. For this
reason we can recognize an affinity between health and broader
human well-being. We evaluate a person or a society in the context
of the typical standards of a human form of life. But this is no
different from asking what it is for a cat, a lungfish or a liver to do
well or badly. To know whether a particular individual is doing
well, we need to know what it is for cats, lungfish and livers to do
well. Consequently, the content of an evaluation is more than an
arbitrary projection of human interests.2
One powerful objection to Aristotelian accounts is that unlike
other animals, there is no unique human form of life but rather a
plurality of culturally defined goods. Human beings are socio-
cultural animals and living well involves living harmoniously with
one’s peers. To do this we need to constantly negotiate individual
and collective differences. However, the underlying assumption
upon which this objection rests is an outdated distinction between
biology and culture which is untenable for various philosophical
and scientific reasons. Put simply, it overemphasizes human diver-
sity while under-emphasizing diversity in the organic world. His-
torical experience has taught us that while tolerance of diversity is
a prima facie good, certain forms of life have proven themselves
incompatible with a properly human existence. By the same token,
recent work in the life sciences has demonstrated the sheer com-
plexity of biota. This new understanding has major ramifications
for our concepts of health and disease.
Health without hair: Christopher
Boorse’s bald naturalism
Baldness, shortness and ugliness are aspects of human life which
have significant impacts upon its quality but which no sensible
theory would call diseases.Yet, this seems precisely the conclusion
one is forced to adopt, if one accepts the standard normativist
definition of disease as a disvalued physical or mental condition.
Equally, the ‘disvalue’ model fails to capture pathological states
which are asymptomatic and thus neither valued not disvalued.
Moreover, disease is an inherent feature of the biological world
which long pre-dated our existence and will outlast us. Thus
disease cannot be an evaluative concept.
This, in brief, is the position which Christopher Boorse has
vigorously defended since the 1970s. It was articulated partly in
response to the debate initiated by Thomas Szasz. Szasz had
argued that psychiatric diagnoses were little more than codified
descriptions of troublesome behaviour. Unlike somatic medicine,
which rests upon a solid core of pathology, psychiatry was really a
sophisticated form of moral and political coercion. Enforced incar-
ceration and psychiatric treatment, routinely employed in both the
totalitarian East and ostensibly liberal West, had no scientific
warrant.
Szasz’s critique quickly provoked a response. One common
objection questioned his dichotomy between somatic medicine’s
apparently objective diagnoses and the normative diagnoses
employed in mental health. Medicine, it was argued, is normative
to the core. The identification of a pathology requires the invoca-
tion of complex evaluative frameworks which vary between cul-
tures and over time. What we identify as a disease is closely related
to what we find troubling enough to treat.
While not primarily concerned with psychiatry, Boorse agreed
with Szasz that somatic diagnoses should be the benchmark. He
vociferously rejects the normativist view and also considers and
dismisses several naturalist options. Diseases cannot simply be
deviations from a statistical norm, as this would have the absurd
implication that top athletes might be considered ill. Neither can a
purely evolutionary account furnish a satisfactory view: Darwinian
accounts emphasize the capacity to successfully reproduce but
reproduction may exact a heavy toll on an individual’s health.
Many childless people live their lives in rude health.
His preferred option therefore is a composite of evolutionary
and statistical conceptions of health which he dubbed the Bio-
Statistical Model (BST). This model has four elements:
1 The reference class is a natural class of organisms of uniform
functional design; specifically, an age-group of a sex and species.
2 A normal function of a part or process within members of the
reference class is a statistically typical contribution by it to their
individual survival and reproduction.
3 Health in a member of the reference class is normal functional
ability: the readiness of each individual part to perform all its
normal functions on typical occasions with at least typical
efficiency.
4 A disease is a type of internal state which impairs health, that is,
reduces one or more functional abilities below typical
efficiency. ([7], p. 555)3
I will not rehearse the main normativist responses. Instead, I
will take a different approach and argue that the account is insuf-
ficiently naturalist. This may seem a paradoxical accusation to
level against someone regarded as the paradigm naturalist, so in
what follows I will attempt to justify my claim.
Whose theory? Which practice?
Much of Boorse’s argument rests upon a rigid distinction between
medical science and clinical practice. Boorse purports to have
revealed the true meaning of the terms ‘health’ and ‘disease’ as
manifested in their use by the appropriate body of experts. This is
to be distinguished from their stereotypical uses in ordinary non-
expert speech. In his most recent defence of the theory, Boorse
states that he is ‘content for the BST to live or die by the consid-
ered usage of pathologists’ ([8], p. 53). But do pathologists even
operate with a definition of disease which resembles Boorse’s?
Moreover, why should pathological definitions of disease be given
priority over those of other medical specialists and layfolk, espe-
cially because the rise of evidence-based medicine has tended to
diminish the centrality of pathology in medicine?2 I also believe, although it is not essential to my argument here, that our
evaluations are successful to the extent that they track how things actually
are in the natural world.
3 In his more recent work [8] he has modified the definition of health to be
simply ‘the absence of disease’.
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Many of these issues are addressed by William Stempsey, a
philosopher with medical training, including a residency as a
pathologist [14]. Stempsey challenges his rigid dichotomy between
medical theory and clinical practice, even in the context of his
favoured area of pathology. As Stempsey notes, most pathologists
are also clinicians and the favoured textbook definition of the
science of pathology is not in terms of functional abnormality but in
terms of the study (logos) of suffering (pathos). It is implausible that
doctors would be concerned with human suffering in a practical
setting but then indifferent to it in a theoretical one.
Pathologists’ primary concern is with the morphological char-
acter of diseases rather than disease per se. Moreover, pathologists
look for definitions which are practically efficacious. There is no
reason to suppose that they have any special expertise in dealing
with the kind of conceptual issues that engage philosophers. Even
if, in unconsidered usage, they give a definition similar to Boorse’s
this would not settle the matter. This would be an empirical socio-
linguistic fact rather than a conceptual norm. The haphazard usage
of one group of specialists has no more authority than that of any
other. Stempsey suggests that the best source for considered usage
would be doctors with philosophical training and he notes that the
overwhelming consensus among philosophically sophisticated
doctors is normativist.
Presumably what Boorse appeals to in pathologists’ usage is an
implicit philosophy of science. Analysis of pathologists’ best
descriptive practice should yield a definition of disease which is
value-free, precisely because this would be the ‘scientific’ defini-
tion of disease. Put aside the potential circularity. Is it even true
that Boorse’s theoretical definition is based upon an adequate
philosophy of science? Stempsey suggests that Boorse has ignored
an entire trend in the history and philosophy of science which
rejects the fact-value distinction.4
A biological theory of disease?
Stempsey suggests that Boorse is unlikely to find support for his
theoretical definition among doctors but it is possible that he might
among biological scientists. However, the problem here is that the
further one gets from medicine, the further one also gets from the
contexts which give sense to concepts like health and disease.
Viewed through an evolutionary lens, our concerns with health and
disease seem curiously parochial. This is eloquently summarized
by Elliot Sober [16]. Sober argues that one of the most significant
aspects of the Darwinian revolution is the replacement of an essen-
tialist conception of species membership with what the biologist
Ernst Mayr defined as ‘population thinking’. Essentialist views of
species view development in terms of progression towards a
‘natural state’. Population models regard species as united only by
reproductive history and characterized by a phenotypic norm of
reaction.
Consider the recent discovery in the Potomac River of male
Largemouth and Smallmouth Bass producing eggs. On the natural
state model, these fish are obviously monsters, as it is unnatural for
males to produce eggs. They are defective specimens of
Micropterus dolomieu and Macropterus salmoides. In a more
natural environment, they would not have developed in this dis-
torted way. The natural state model reflects common-sense devel-
opmental assumptions. The population model’s analysis would be
more complex. The production of eggs by male fish is part of the
reaction norm for that genotype, as expressed in a polluted envi-
ronment. Furthermore, it is possible that some such mutation may
actually increase the inclusive fitness of an individual such that its
genes come to dominate future populations. There is nothing in the
nature of the species itself that permits us to classify this variation
as defective.
This view seems counter-intuitive when we turn to ideas of
health and disease. Sober notes that:
our current conceptions of function and dysfunction, of
disease and health seem to be based upon the kinds of distinc-
tions recommended by the Natural State Model. And both of
these distinctions resist characterization in terms of maximum
fitness. For virtually any trait you please, there can be envi-
ronments in which the trait is selected for, or selected against.
Diseases can be rendered advantageous, and health can be
made to represent a reproductive cost [16].
This draws upon some fairly obvious observations about the evo-
lutionary process: on the one hand, its cold indifference to the
interests of any organism or species; on the other, that any function
can only be defined as normal in relation to a given selective
environment.
In his Rebuttal, Boorse considers, but fails to comprehend, just
how devastating the ‘bad biology’ arguments are to his case. They
thoroughly undermine his central notion of a species design as
anything other than a theoretical abstraction. Boorse appeals to the
authority of anatomical textbooks. He argues that while the evo-
lutionary process selects from variation, selective pressures ulti-
mately produce the kinds of uniformities found in Gray’s
Anatomy. Diseases and deformities are statistical deviations from
those uniformities. This intuitively appealing idea formed a cor-
nerstone of a recent fad called evolutionary psychology. Evolu-
tionary psychologists argued that just as evolution produces
anatomical uniformity, we can also expect it to produce psycho-
logical uniformity. In his recent devastating critique David Buller
carefully dismantles the analogy [17].
Two of his arguments are especially devastating. First, Buller
argues that the type of uniformities upon which Gray’s Anatomy is
based are abstractions designed for pedagogic purposes. Like any
abstraction they can illuminate or they can mislead depending
upon context. Notoriously, the 70-kg male was until recently con-
sidered the anatomical norm. As a result, disastrous clinical deci-
sions were made as a result of neglecting profound physiological
differences between men and women. Furthermore, conditions
which only affect women were either neglected or else mistakenly
treated as pathological. Florid textbook descriptions abound of
normal processes like menstruation and childbirth [18].
Second, the greater the degree of uniformity, the less likely a
given feature is unique to our species. As Buller ([17], p. 426)
notes, ‘all primates have two hands, all mammals have lungs, and
all vertebrates have two eyes, a heart, a liver, and a stomach’. This
is not necessarily as devastating an objection to Boorse as it is to
the evolutionary psychologists. After all, one of Boorse’s strongest
arguments against normativism is that it neglects our continuities
with other animal species and he is not searching for an essential
human nature.
4 The discussion broaches the much broader question of the alleged value-
freedom of science. Stempsey has defended elsewhere at much greater
length a position that he describes as ‘value-dependent realism’ [15].
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Against design
However, closer consideration reveals a deeper problem. If we
abandon the notion of a uniform ‘species design’ then a core tenet
of his analysis is undermined. With a notion of ‘species design’
certain functions are simply a given and it is possible to make
sense of the claim that the ‘normal is the natural’ without illicitly
importing evaluative premises. Without it, it becomes a matter of
analytic choice what to count in and what to count out. Do we, for
instance, have a wide comparison class, against which we evaluate
members of our own and other species? Or alternatively, do we
have a narrow class restricted perhaps (as Boorse suggests) to a
particular age group of a particular gender. If we choose the
former, we elide the difference between human and veterinary
medicine. If choose the latter, the obvious response is to wonder
why we should stop there. Would not a more accurate assessment
be arrived at, if we only considered subjects living in the same
locale and pursuing similar occupations? Consider here the noto-
rious problems of devising common health outcomes for compar-
ing Scandinavians and Scots.
Buller’s third related argument is that if we narrow our focus
from putative uniformities at a global level, we come to see that
there are numerous differences between individual human beings.
As a result, ‘strictly speaking, there is no single human anatomy
and physiology possessed by all humans around the world’. In
support of this, he lists conditions such as situs inversus, children
born with only one kidney, or with ambiguous genitalia and less
dramatically the variation in human blood type. He urges therefore
that we abandon ‘the idea that Gray’s Anatomy provides a single
“detailed” and “precise” picture of the anatomy and physiology of
every human on earth [since this] is plausible only if one ignores
known facts about human anatomical and physiological variation’.
The same holds, mutatis mutandis, for Boorse’s appeal to uniform
design in support of this theoretical definition of health. But
without this idealization, neither simple deviation from norm nor
diminished function will provide a satisfactory value-free concep-
tion of disease.
As Buller later argues, it is an unfortunate historical accident
that Darwin’s theory had to be articulated in opposition to Natural
Theology. We are thus burdened with a conceptual framework of
design metaphors. Talk of a uniform species design is seriously
misleading both practically and theoretically. As medicine increas-
ingly conquers pathogenic disease and shifts its attention to
genetic impairment, the situation becomes even more complex.
Take Glucose 6-Phosphate Dehydrogenase Deficiency or ‘favism’.
Those afflicted experience anaemia and related disorders after
exposure to fava beans. Even the most hard-headed genetic reduc-
tionist would accept that the disease only emerges as the result of
a complex interaction between genetic predisposition and devel-
opmental contingencies. Someone raised in a culture which
shunned fava beans would be unaffected. Moreover, as with sickle-
cell anaemia, there is some evidence that the gene for favism has
conveyed anti-malarial benefits, on heterozygote female carriers
[19].
From a biological perspective, there is consequently no useful
way of specifying the normal or natural state of an organism outside
some environmental context. One forlorn strategy that evolutionary
psychologists have resorted to is to appeal to the putative ‘wild
state’of the human genome. The candidate for this is the Pleistocen
Savannah. Disregard for the moment the fact that the Pleistocene
period encompassed a variety of ice ages and temperate periods and
was characterized at several points by mass migrations. When
unpacked, talk of a genotypes’s natural environment amounts to
little more than the observation that that particular genotype was
selected for, when compared with all the available alternatives. It is
always logically possible that a different environment may have
been even more advantageous to that genotype or conversely that
another genotype may have been even more successful.
Boorse’s talk of uniform design is beset by similar problems. In
both cases, a particular trait is mapped onto an idealized version of
an ancestral selective environment and the extent to which that trait
is functioning well or badly in the current environment is then
given as evidence for how far it remains true to its natural design.
This is a curiously static version of evolutionary theory. If we
recall that the primary purpose of evolutionary theory was to
explain diversity rather than stasis, it becomes even more curious.
Sometimes the rationale is that the length of time is crucial,
because a certain feature has been stable over a long period, it is
more natural than one that has recently developed.
There are a number of possible responses. The first is that given
the enormous length of time involved in the evolutionary process,
there is no reason to privilege the Pleistocene over any period of
human evolution, including our current one. For instance, one of the
most crucial events in human development was our discovery of
agriculture but it seems likely that for ecological reasons this could
only have occurred during the later Holocene period [20] Growing
evidence suggests that the development of agriculture led to
increasing parasite load and thus a massively changed selective
environment. Indeed, rather than slowing down, there seems to have
been a degree of speeding up of human genetic evolution, possibly
in response to increased pressures upon the immune system.
The study of such gene–culture interaction forms part of a larger
process in the biological sciences which aims at integrating evo-
lutionary and developmental insights. As John Dupré has argued,
this represents a shift away from an older preformationist view of
development, in which the life cycle of an organism was thought to
unfold along lines ‘programmed’ by a genetic ‘blueprint’ towards
one which sees development in much more epigenetic terms [21].
This view stresses the mutually conditioning character of devel-
opmental process and the heavy hand that a wide range of contin-
gencies play in that process.
Some theorists have even gone so far as to posit the life cycle of
the organism, rather than the gene as the primary unit of selection
[22–24]. Even less radical thinkers acknowledge that selection,
particular in the case of human beings, operates at multiple levels
[25]. There is not the space to engage with these detailed technical
debates but the implication for the accounts of health and illness
are profound. An epigenetic view of organismic development
undermines the appeal to ‘uniform functional design’ upon which
Boorse’s analysis so heavily relies. Function attribution only
makes sense in the context of the life cycle of the organism in
question, or so I will argue in the next section.
Organism, mechanisms and value
The shift towards a developmentalist perspective marks a shift
away from a Cartesian view of organisms as little machines. It
might raise ‘the bogey of vitalism’ in some readers’ minds. Surely
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modern science has freed us of an anthropomorophic view of
living things and rendered obsolete the dichotomy between
animate and inanimate matter. Boorse’s naturalist theory of health
can be viewed as an attempt to extend that project into medicine
which has always been saddled with the ambivalent status of being
both science and art. His aim was to supply a theory which did
justice to the distinctiveness of living things without importing
illicit evaluative assumptions. The fact that he is unable to suc-
cessfully achieve this suggests a worrying possibility: perhaps it is
not possible to save the phenomenon in the health sciences without
the (illicit) projection of human values.
Earlier, I summarily rejected such a projectivist version of nor-
mativism. In what follows I will expand upon this and also defend
my naturalized form of normativism. Implicit in all versions of the
projectivist view is the following assumption: as the natural world
is bereft of all value, any value we discover there must come from
outside. Typical candidates include a deity or human beings
whether individually or collectively. In what follows, I will restrict
my considerations to humans.
Projectivism offers us an image of human beings standing
outside the natural world projecting our values onto it which, while
intelligible on some crude theological visions, flies in the face of
all hitherto scientific understanding but most especially Darwin-
ism. As Boorse rightly argues, any satisfactory theory should not
ignore the continuities between ourselves and other animals.
However, in order to maintain that continuity, Boorse feels com-
pelled to reject any legitimate role for values in the diagnosis of
disease. This betrays a fundamental projectivist assumption: if
health and disease are necessarily evaluative concepts, then they
cannot be genuinely part of the furniture of the world.
Projectivism rests upon two distinct theses: the first is that
scientific rigour equates with its degree of value-freedom; the
second is that the universe, as discovered by the natural sciences is
necessarily disenchanted. Indeed, the disenchantment thesis pro-
vides the warrant for the value-freedom of scientific enquiry.
These theses are, however, distinguishable. Value-freedom as a
postulate was formulated explicitly (if never clearly) by Max
Weber and was intended primarily as an account of the method-
ology of the social sciences. Because social phenomenon is nec-
essarily value-laden Weber recognized the danger of bias. His
central concept, Verstehen, entails that in conducting social or
anthropological research one should not approach one’s subjects
from an alien standpoint. Weber’s maxim is thus most intelligibly
rendered as the claim that one should be careful in one’s choice of
framework not that one values can be dispensed with.
Furthermore, recent work in the history and philosophy of
science has questioned whether even the natural sciences are ever
genuinely value-free [26,27]. Many philosophers including Boorse
have grudgingly acknowledged this, while falling back upon a
rigid distinction between epistemic and non-epistemic values.
According to this distinction, epistemic values, such as integrity,
fidelity to evidential canons and so on are appropriate whereas
non-epistemic values are not. This merely kits out the dowdy
fact-value dichotomy in more fashionable garb.
Hilary Putnam has proposed a ‘disinflation’ of the fact-value
dichotomy which should address some of the worries about illic-
itly importing values into science. We can acknowledge
a distinction to be drawn (one that is useful in some contexts)
between ethical judgments and other sorts of judgments. This
is undoubtedly the case, just as it is undoubtedly the case that
there is a distinction to be drawn (and one that is useful in
some contexts) between chemical judgments and judgments
that do not belong to the field of chemistry. But nothing meta-
physical follows from the existence of a fact-value distinction
in this (modest) sense. ([27], p. 19)
In actual scientific practice, Putnam notes, value and fact are
intermingled. To illustrate this, one might distinguish between a
medical scientist and a quack. Clearly, they are distinguishable in
terms of the respective methodologies each employs but to reduce
the distinction to this alone is to miss something crucial. Even
someone using an unsuccessful method can still manifest many
intellectual virtues. The genuine medical scientist has a commit-
ment to the truth of her findings which the quack does not. The
quack might be happier if his pills and potions worked, not least
because this would increase his sales. But provided that his decep-
tion goes undetected, the quack is indifferent to the truth of his
claims, in ways that the scientist cannot be. Indeed, part of the
appeal of the notion of value-freedom is that it implies that the
scientist places the pursuit of truth above all other considerations.
In the real world, scientists’ motives may be less noble. But the
intellectual pedigree of the natural sciences is well-earned and
partly reflects a recognition that many scientists do manifest a high
degree of personal and intellectual integrity. The notion therefore
that any scientific practice is value-free, while intended to flatter
the natural sciences is ultimately demeaning. The worry that
science may be corrupted by illicit moral or political values is
genuine but the best safeguard against is not to pretend that sci-
entists operate in an evaluative vacuum but rather to foster the right
kinds of intellectual and moral values, some of which will be
internal to the sciences but others of which draw upon a common
set of shared values.
Consider another example. Running diagnostic tests is a core
activity of medical investigation and may appear at first blush to be
a paradigmatically value-free domain. However, depending upon
how the test is calibrated, it may yield either false negatives or
false positives. The researcher has to make a decision about direc-
tion of error. Suppose the test in question detects prostate cancer in
elderly men. Because many men will die with, though not of,
prostate cancer, the decision must be made as to whether it is worth
risking emotionally traumatizing these men and making them
undergo a painful and costly procedure. A large number of false
positives are likely to have this effect and thus the tendency has
been to favour false negatives.
Suppose however the test in question detected testicular cancer
in younger men. The fact that the cancer in question is eminently
controllable, if detected early, but otherwise aggressive, combined
with the fact that the men in question have an entire working and
reproductive life ahead of them tends towards a preponderances of
false positives. Practical considerations, and values as constitutive
elements of those considerations, determine diagnostic outcomes.
Some of the values in question are epistemic, others are clearly
ethical.
The value of life
The arguments in favour of a naturalized normativism about health
run deeper. Taken together they state: judgements about health are
judgements about living beings. Medical science can never be just
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applied pathology for the simple reason that a central defining
feature of living beings is typically absent in the path lab. Living
beings are defined above all else by the characteristic activities
which they undertake in pursuit of their life goals. This means that
certain predicates are attributable to living beings which do not
apply to inanimate matter. This insight is captured well in Michael
Thompson’s essay The Representation of Life [28]. He suggests
that when we come to think about life certain forms of thought
become appropriate which do not apply to inanimate matter.
Thompson illustrates this with a discussion from a biology text,
in which the author attempts to tabulate some of the defining
features of living beings. As Thompson points out, even where the
vocabulary used shares similarities with the discussion of inani-
mate objects in biology it takes a distinctive form. This becomes
most obvious in the discussion of the claim that ‘living things
respond to stimuli’. This fairly standard formulation assimilates
the description of living processes to analogous inanimate ones.
Thompson offers the following example:
The warming of an asphalt road bed and the train of photo-
synthetical events in a green leaf are both of them, in some
sense, the effect of sunlight. And the thawing of icy ponds and
the opening of maple buds are each occasioned by rising
spring temperatures [28].
From the physical point of view, energy conversion occurs in all
of these cases. However, we miss something distinctive about
biological explanations if this is all we see. In the case of biologi-
cal phenomena, the question: ‘and what happens next?’ has a
special sense. For, what we are interested in is how a given
process, say photosynthesis or budding, figures in the life of the
organism, what contribution it makes to the plant’s characteristic
life activities. Questions about characteristic life activities make no
sense when dealing with planets or rivers.
For this reason, the appropriate form of judgement for living
beings is what Thompson refers to as the Aristotelian categorical.
This is a statement like: ‘swallows fly south in Winter’ which is
true in general for swallows, and which gives a description of a
feature of the characteristic form of life of a swallow but which,
unlike the exceptionless generalities of physics and chemistry, is
not undermined by the discovery of aberrant swallows. The
swallow is aberrant precisely because it is not acting as a swallow
should.
Boorse is sensitive to some of the issues here. In his Rebuttal, he
stresses the centrality of the notion of organisms as goal-directed
systems to his view of health and disease. The problem for Boorse
is that is not possible to have a satisfying account of goal-directed
systems which is value-neutral in his required sense. The most
promising attempt to offer an aseptic analysis of biological func-
tion can be found in cybernetic systems theory. Mark Bedau has
demonstrated that such an approach cannot succeed [29].
The problem with this approach is that, on the aseptic analysis,
any steady state system will pass the test for being goal-directed.
To illustrate this, Bedau asks us to consider the distinction between
the biological processes that maintain a steady concentration of
approximately 90% water in mammalian blood and the swinging
of a pendulum. Both of these can be understood as equilibrium
systems but only one is truly goal-directed. If the systems theorist
conceded that both were, in a sense, goal-directed the scope of
goal-directed explanation would thereby become vacuously
extended.
Bedau expands this example by asking us to consider a marble-
shaped object in a bowl. The tendency of the marble to return to the
bottom of the bowl does not make the ‘marble-plus-bowl’ a goal
directed. The example is obviously trivial and a systems’ theorist
might propose that we project goals onto systems to the extent that
we are interested in them and on this account the reason that the
marble-plus-bowl system is not truly goal-directed is the fact that
no one is interested in it. This example parallels the projectivist
claim concerning health and disease and faces similar problems.
Presumably there would still be goal-directed systems in nature
without the existence of human beings and similarly we must
assume that there currently are innumerable such systems of which
we are unaware and in which we could not be interested. By the
same token, it might be possible for someone to take an interest in
whether the marble returns to the bottom of a bowl without it being
genuinely goal-directed. Crooked casinos notwithstanding, rou-
lette wheels are not goal-directed systems.
After considering and rejecting a number of further standard
defences of the systems approach to teleology, Bedau argues that
‘equilibrium systems fail to be genuinely goal-directed, when their
equilibrium maintaining behaviour is of no value for anything’
[29]. Goal-directed systems, whether natural or artefacts, benefit
some living being. Bedau illustrates this by considering the cir-
cumstances under which the marble-plus-bowl system could
become genuinely goal-directed. Perhaps a creature has evolved
with ‘marble-plus-ball’ organ which enables it to balance cor-
rectly. Possession of this organ benefits the creature to the extent
that it needs to balance in pursuit of its characteristic life activities.
Similarly, we can imagine a ‘marble-plus-bowl’ style instrument
that someone uses to measure flat surfaces. Nothing has changed
in the mechanical principles upon which the marble-plus-ball
system operates. What has changed is the context. Both the organ
and the instrument are now of benefit to something and it is this
which entitles us to regard them as genuinely goal-directed.
Conclusion
While all living beings suffer disease and at least some of them
may fear it, none have the ability to conceptualize it and orientate
their individual and collective responses to it in the way that we do.
Moreover, the pursuit of health provides a compelling reason to act
for rational beings such as ourselves. Thus veterinarians give
advice to owners but not to their pets. Other animals act or fail to
act in ways that promote their health. We, by contrast, can be said
to have a responsibility, all things considered, to protect health. We
should of course be mindful of the continuities between ourselves
and other animals. Darwinism teaches us this much. But we should
also attend to the differences. The naturalistic perspective I have
attempted to outline here gives us a framework for doing this.
When we start to consider living beings concepts like values,
goals and interests seem inescapable. For the purpose of this paper,
I have not attempted to engage with the thornier metaphysical
question of whether this inescapability represents an inherent
feature of our conceptual scheme or whether it is built into the
nature of reality.5 What I have hopefully succeeded in doing is
undermining the projectivist account of value in such a way that
neither a bare naturalist account such as Boorse’s or a projectivist
5 My own preference is for a moderate realism.
jep_1393
Health – beyond normativism and naturalism R. P. Hamilton
© 2010 Blackwell Publishing Ltd6
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99
100
101
102
103
104
105
106
107
108
109
110
111
112
113
114
115
116
117
JOBNAME: No Job Name PAGE: 7 SESS: 17 OUTPUT: Mon Feb 1 17:55:40 2010 SUM: 7A6D4411
/v2451/blackwell/journals/jep_v0_i0/jep_1393
version of normativism seems attractive. Given that all our inter-
actions with the world and each other are mediated through our
concepts there is a trivial sense in which values are projections of
our interests. But in this trivial sense, so to is the conceptual
framework with which we understand living things.
If we take projectivism seriously, then it seems to inevitably
degenerate into the claim that our values are mere projections. But
if this is so, we seem forced to admit that our perception of living
beings as self-organized goal-directed entities must also be. But if
the claim that the existence of health and disease somehow pre-
suppose the existence of human minds is implausible, then the idea
that the very existence of other living beings, for whom ‘to exist is
to live’, depends upon us is even more so. Idealism seems too high
a price to pay for naturalism6.
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